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This	  article	  aims	  to	  explain	  two	  contrasting	  cases	  of	  bureaucratic	  co-­‐operation:	  the	  
co-­‐operation	  practices	  of	  two	  similar	  European	  agencies—the	  European	  Union’s	  Law	  
Enforcement	  Agency	  (Europol)	  and	  the	  European	  Agency	  for	  the	  Management	  of	  
Operational	  Co-­‐operation	  at	  the	  External	  Borders	  (Frontex)—with	  corresponding	  
national-­‐level	  structures.	  Both	  European	  agencies	  were	  set	  up	  to	  tackle	  specific	  
policy	  problems	  by	  fostering	  operational	  co-­‐operation	  among	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  
in	  the	  area	  of	  law	  enforcement	  and	  border	  management.	  The	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  fields	  
in	  which	  both	  agencies	  operate	  (i.e.,	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  sovereignty)	  raises	  
considerable	  potential	  for	  tensions	  with	  co-­‐existing	  national	  structures.	  Rather	  
surprisingly	  however,	  co-­‐operation	  has	  developed	  smoothly	  in	  one	  case	  (i.e.,	  border	  
management)	  and	  has	  proven	  extremely	  difficult	  in	  the	  other	  (i.e.,	  law	  
enforcement).	  To	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  puzzle,	  the	  article	  adopts	  a	  theoretical	  
approach	  to	  co-­‐operation	  that	  is	  both	  ‘turf’	  and	  reputation-­‐sensitive.	  Informed	  by	  
insights	  from	  classic	  literature	  on	  bureaucratic	  behaviour	  and	  more	  recent,	  
influential	  work	  on	  organisational	  reputation,	  and	  drawing	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  documents	  
and	  interview	  material,	  it	  argues	  that	  the	  divergent	  co-­‐operation	  outcomes	  in	  the	  
two	  cases	  are	  shaped	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  the	  different	  reputational	  impact	  of	  co-­‐
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1.	  Introduction	  
	  
In	  today’s	  interconnected	  world,	  complex	  policy	  problems—be	  it	  environmental	  
issues,	  serious	  crime,	  illegal	  immigration—increasingly	  span	  across	  geographical	  
borders	  and	  regulatory	  jurisdictions.	  Meaningful	  regulatory	  response	  is	  therefore,	  
necessarily	  of	  a	  growing	  trans-­‐boundary	  nature;	  it	  entails	  the	  involvement	  of	  
manifold	  bureaucratic	  entities,	  bypassing	  hierarchical	  centre-­‐periphery	  divides	  and	  
cross-­‐cutting	  traditional	  regulatory	  jurisdictions.	  Crucial	  to	  this	  response,	  and	  
therefore,	  to	  the	  successful	  tackling	  of	  such	  complex	  policy	  problems,	  is	  how	  
bureaucratic	  co-­‐operation	  plays	  out	  in	  practice.	  
	  
Nowhere	  are	  such	  attempts	  at	  engendering	  trans-­‐boundary	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  co-­‐
operation	  as	  institutionally	  visible	  as	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)—the	  
quintessential	  ‘regulatory	  state’	  (Majone	  1996;	  1997),	  characterised	  by	  a	  multiplicity	  
of	  regulatory	  actors,	  operating	  and	  co-­‐operating	  across	  different	  levels	  of	  
governance.	  In	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  we	  have	  seen	  for	  instance,	  among	  others,	  the	  
rise	  of	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  bureaucratic	  actors	  at	  the	  EU	  level—European	  agencies,	  set	  
up	  to	  address	  specific	  common	  problems	  through	  improved	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐
operation	  among	  (fragments	  of)	  member	  states’	  bureaucracies	  (Gehring	  and	  Krapohl	  
2007;	  Dehousse	  2008;	  Groenleer	  2009;	  Special	  Issue	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  European	  
Public	  Policy	  2011;	  Busuioc,	  Groenleer	  and	  Trondal	  2012;	  cf.	  Kelemen	  2002;	  Kelemen	  
and	  Tarrant	  2011).	  These	  agencies,	  thirty-­‐five	  to	  date,	  operate	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
regulatory	  areas—such	  as	  food	  safety,	  chemicals,	  energy,	  disease	  prevention,	  
aviation	  safety	  and	  financial	  supervision,	  among	  others—and	  are	  themselves	  heavily	  
reliant	  on	  co-­‐operation	  from	  national	  structures	  (both	  horizontally,	  amongst	  each	  
other	  as	  well	  as	  vertically,	  with	  the	  EU	  level)	  to	  function	  and	  fulfil	  their	  mandates.	  
	  
Bureaucratic	  or	  inter-­‐agency	  co-­‐operation	  however,	  is	  not	  exactly	  easy	  to	  come	  by.	  It	  
is	  one	  of	  those	  elusive	  ‘good	  things’:	  both	  desirable	  and	  necessary,	  yet	  hard	  to	  
implement.	  The	  adoption	  of	  rules	  mandating	  co-­‐operation	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  
formal	  decree	  will	  be	  followed	  through.	  The	  ‘practice’	  of	  inter-­‐agency	  co-­‐operation	  is	  
much	  less	  of	  a	  straightforward	  matter	  (Bryson	  et	  al.	  2006):	  While	  we	  do	  encounter	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‘success	  stories’,	  examples	  of	  bureaucratic	  reluctance	  to	  co-­‐operate	  and	  even	  full-­‐
blown	  ‘turf	  wars’	  (Wilson	  1989,	  pp.	  185-­‐188;	  195)	  abound,	  be	  it	  that	  the	  context	  is	  
trans-­‐national	  or	  a	  strictly	  national	  one.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  only	  
compounded	  in	  a	  trans-­‐boundary	  context,	  however.	  With	  the	  involvement	  of	  
multiple	  actors,	  from	  different	  jurisdictions,	  and	  which,	  to	  complicate	  matters,	  are	  
not	  accustomed	  to	  working	  together,	  tensions,	  inconsistencies	  and	  ‘turf	  wars’	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  even	  more	  prevalent.	  	  
	  
The	  difficulties	  and	  contradictions	  inherent	  in	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  efforts	  are	  
poignantly	  illustrated	  by	  two	  contrasting	  cases	  of	  co-­‐operation:	  the	  co-­‐operation	  
practices	  of	  two	  similar	  European	  agencies—the	  European	  Union’s	  Law	  Enforcement	  
Agency	  (Europol)	  and	  the	  European	  Agency	  for	  the	  Management	  of	  Operational	  Co-­‐
operation	  at	  the	  External	  Borders	  (Frontex)—with	  corresponding	  national-­‐level	  
structures.	  Both	  EU	  agencies	  were	  set	  up	  to	  tackle	  specific	  policy	  problems—serious	  
crime	  of	  a	  trans-­‐national	  nature	  and	  illegal	  migration,	  respectively—by	  fostering	  
operational	  co-­‐operation	  among	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  in	  the	  area	  of	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  border	  management.	  The	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  fields	  in	  which	  both	  
agencies	  operate	  (i.e.,	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  sovereignty)	  raises	  considerable	  potential	  
for	  tensions	  with	  co-­‐existing	  national	  structures.	  Moreover,	  the	  two	  services	  are	  
often	  merged	  into	  one	  authority	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Rather	  surprisingly	  however,	  
in	  practice	  the	  two	  agencies—while	  very	  similar	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  expected	  to	  
have	  face	  comparable	  co-­‐operation	  challenges—	  have	  had	  dissimilar	  co-­‐operation	  
experiences.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  below,	  while	  Europol	  has	  encountered	  significant	  co-­‐
operation	  difficulties,	  manifested	  in	  a	  strong	  reluctance	  by	  national	  forces	  to	  co-­‐
operate	  across	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  key	  agency	  activities,	  Frontex,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
has	  benefitted	  from	  co-­‐operation	  and	  support	  post-­‐delegation	  from	  national	  
authorities.	  	  
	  
To	  explore	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  puzzle,	  the	  article	  adopts	  a	  theoretical	  approach	  
to	  co-­‐operation	  that	  is	  both	  ‘turf’	  and	  reputation-­‐sensitive.	  Informed	  by	  insights	  
from	  classic	  literature	  on	  bureaucratic	  behaviour	  (Wilson	  1989)	  and	  more	  recent,	  
influential	  work	  on	  organisational	  reputation	  (Carpenter	  2001,	  2010;	  Carpenter	  and	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Krause	  2012;	  Gilad	  2009,	  Gilad	  and	  Yogev	  2012;	  Maor	  2010,	  2013),	  it	  argues	  that	  
turf-­‐conscious	  bureaucratic	  actors	  co-­‐operate	  subject	  to	  positive	  reputational	  
calculations.	  Organisational	  reputation,	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  it	  is	  accrued	  in	  
various	  contexts,	  can	  be	  important,	  it	  is	  argued,	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  bureaucratic	  
willingness	  to	  co-­‐operate	  or	  the	  lack	  thereof.	  
	  
The	  topic	  of	  co-­‐operation	  has	  received	  considerable	  attention	  from	  various	  strands	  
of	  literature—particularly	  literature	  on	  collaborative	  governance,	  inter-­‐
organisational	  co-­‐operation	  and	  collaborative	  public	  management	  (see	  for	  instance,	  
Bryson	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Ansell	  and	  Gash	  2008;	  Emerson	  et	  al.	  2011	  for	  comprehensive	  
literature	  overviews	  and	  efforts	  to	  systematise	  existing	  approaches).	  While	  this	  
literature	  identifies	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  that	  can	  determine	  co-­‐operation	  such	  as	  
leadership,	  incentives,	  (resource)	  inter-­‐dependence,	  uncertainty	  etc.,	  the	  role	  of	  
organisational	  reputation(s)	  in	  conditioning	  co-­‐operation	  remains	  largely	  
unexplored.	  The	  two	  cases	  analysed	  here	  however,	  indicate	  that	  reputation	  can	  be	  a	  
key	  consideration	  in	  public	  bodies’	  commitment	  to	  co-­‐operation	  or	  to	  the	  contrary,	  
their	  resistance	  to	  such	  endeavours.	  	  
	  
The	  article	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	  first	  of	  all,	  the	  proposed	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  
co-­‐operation	  is	  laid	  out.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  section	  on	  methods,	  where	  case	  
selection	  and	  data	  sources	  are	  addressed.	  Next,	  the	  practices	  of	  co-­‐operation	  of	  
national	  structures	  with	  the	  two	  EU	  agencies	  are	  examined	  in	  turn,	  in	  a	  comparative	  
fashion,	  pointing	  at	  significant	  differences	  in	  our	  two	  cases.	  The	  following	  section	  
attempts	  to	  explain	  the	  observed	  differences	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  proposed	  
theoretical	  approach.	  In	  one	  field,	  co-­‐operation	  depletes	  important	  reputational	  
resources	  of	  national	  offices.	  This	  threatens	  their	  ‘reputational	  uniqueness’,	  
triggering	  turf-­‐protective	  tendencies	  and	  a	  reluctance	  to	  co-­‐operate.	  In	  the	  other	  
case,	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  co-­‐operation	  efforts	  bring	  important	  gains	  to	  national	  
authorities’	  ability	  to	  discharge	  their	  tasks	  successfully—and	  thus,	  to	  their	  
reputation-­‐building	  efforts.	  Crucially	  however,	  they	  do	  so	  without	  threatening	  their	  
‘reputational	  uniqueness’.	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2.	  Theoretical	  Approach:	  Co-­‐operation	  Meets	  Reputation	  
	  
An	  important,	  and	  growing,	  body	  of	  work	  emphasises	  the	  key	  relevance	  of	  
reputational	  considerations	  in	  understanding	  bureaucratic	  behaviour	  (Carpenter	  
2001,	  2010;	  Carpenter	  and	  Krause	  2012;	  Maor	  2013).	  In	  this	  approach,	  the	  
reputation	  an	  agency	  cultivates—thorough	  its	  (uneven)	  response	  to	  expectations	  
from	  multiple	  audiences—is	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  its	  power,	  which	  can	  allow	  it	  to	  
enlist	  public	  support,	  build	  its	  autonomy,	  protect	  it	  from	  external	  attacks	  and	  
ultimately,	  help	  ensure	  its	  survival	  (Carpenter	  2001,	  2010;	  Maor	  2013).	  
Organisations	  therefore,	  expend	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  and	  effort	  cultivating	  this	  
‘valuable	  political	  asset’	  (Carpenter	  2002).	  
	  
Reputation-­‐based	  accounts	  have	  been	  initially	  relied	  upon	  to	  explain	  aspects	  of	  
agency	  behaviour	  pertaining	  to	  bureaucratic	  autonomy	  and	  autonomy	  forging	  
(Carpenter	  2001).	  They	  are	  increasingly	  being	  used	  however,	  to	  explain	  a	  whole	  
array	  of	  regulatory	  behaviour	  (Carpenter	  2010;	  Carpenter	  and	  Krause	  2012)	  of	  
regulators	  and	  regulatees	  alike	  as	  well	  as	  their	  interactions	  such	  as:	  regulatory	  
enforcement	  practices	  (Gilad	  2009;	  Maor	  and	  Sulitzeanu-­‐Kenan	  2013;	  Etienne	  
forthcoming),	  regulators’	  prioritisation	  of	  tasks	  (Carpenter	  2002),	  jurisdiction	  
claiming	  (Maor	  2010)	  or	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  communication	  (Maor	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Gilad	  
et	  al.	  2013).	  	  Given	  that	  co-­‐operation	  is	  just	  another	  (specific)	  instance	  of	  
bureaucratic	  behaviour—in	  the	  form	  of	  two	  or	  more	  organisational	  entities	  working	  
together	  towards	  implementing	  a	  joint	  public	  policy	  goal—research	  on	  the	  issue	  
from	  a	  reputational	  perspective	  could	  prove	  particularly	  insightful	  (see	  Gilad	  2009,	  
on	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	  in	  shaping	  the	  mutual	  co-­‐operation	  of	  regulators	  and	  
corporations	  in	  enforcement).	  
	  
Drawing	  on	  this	  (and	  earlier)	  literature,	  this	  article	  proposes	  to	  view	  co-­‐operation	  
outcomes	  as	  a	  function	  of	  reputation	  and	  related	  ‘turf’	  considerations.	  Reputation	  is	  
defined	  as	  ‘a	  set	  of	  symbolic	  beliefs	  about	  the	  unique	  or	  separable	  capacities,	  roles,	  
and	  obligations	  of	  an	  organization,	  where	  these	  beliefs	  are	  embedded	  in	  audience	  
networks’	  (Carpenter	  2010,	  p.	  45).	  ‘Turf’	  is	  understood	  here	  as	  an	  agency’s	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distinctive	  ‘jurisdiction’/‘mission’	  (Wilson	  1989,	  p.	  182)	  or	  ‘regulatory	  dominion’	  
(Maor	  2010,	  p.	  136).	  Although	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘turf’	  has	  not	  explicitly	  been	  discussed	  
(for	  an	  exception,	  see	  Maor	  2010)	  and	  developed	  as	  such	  in	  reputation	  theory,	  it	  
seems	  intuitively	  crucial	  to	  an	  agency	  being	  able	  to	  forge	  a	  distinctive	  organisational	  
reputation.	  	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  agencies,	  like	  other	  organisations,	  are	  assessed	  by	  their	  
audiences	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  reputation,	  which	  centres	  ‘on	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  
unique	  services	  capably’	  (Maor	  2013,	  p.	  4),	  on	  ‘the	  proficient	  execution	  of	  a	  unique	  
function’	  (Gilad	  and	  Yogev	  2012,	  p.	  4).	  They	  therefore,	  strategically	  cultivate	  
‘reputational	  uniqueness’	  (Carpenter	  2001,	  p.	  5),	  a	  reputation,	  ‘which	  enables	  an	  
agency	  that	  possesses	  it	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  for	  unique	  contribution	  to	  the	  public	  good’	  
(Maor	  2013,	  p.	  3;	  Maor	  et	  al.	  2013,	  p.	  583),	  different	  from	  other	  organizations.	  It	  is,	  
in	  other	  words,	  organisational	  (survival)	  mantra	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  distinctive	  reputation,	  
a	  ‘niche	  role’	  (Gilad	  and	  Yogev	  2012).	  Central	  to	  this	  is	  maintaining	  and	  protecting	  a	  
separate	  ‘turf’	  or	  ‘regulatory	  dominion’	  through	  efforts	  ‘to	  seek	  out	  tasks	  that	  are	  
not	  performed	  by	  others’,	  ‘to	  fight	  organisations	  that	  try	  to	  perform	  your	  tasks’	  and	  
relatedly,	  therefore,	  ‘to	  be	  wary	  of	  joint	  or	  cooperative	  ventures’	  (Wilson	  1989,	  pp.	  
189-­‐190).	  	  
	  
Co-­‐operation	  efforts	  can	  be	  risky;	  they	  can	  unwittingly	  bring	  about	  new	  bureaucratic	  
rivals,	  intruding	  upon	  one’s	  ‘regulatory	  dominion.’	  This	  would	  jeopardise	  an	  
organisation’s	  unique	  function,	  its	  organisational	  claim	  to	  uniqueness.	  This	  helps	  
explain	  why	  in	  practice,	  agencies	  are	  time	  and	  time	  again	  found	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  
co-­‐operate	  and	  highly	  defensive	  of	  their	  ‘turf’:	  ‘regulatory	  bureaucracies,	  like	  all	  
bureaucracies	  are	  keen	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  turf’	  (Baldwin	  et	  al.	  2011,	  p.	  368;	  see	  
also	  Wilson	  1989,	  Chapter	  10	  on	  ‘turf’	  more	  broadly).	  Such	  behaviour	  makes	  good	  
sense	  when	  considered	  from	  a	  reputational	  perspective.	  	  	  
	  
The	  theoretical	  argument	  put	  forward	  here	  therefore,	  is	  that	  whether	  an	  agency	  is	  
willing	  to	  engage	  in	  co-­‐operative	  efforts,	  or	  to	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  turf-­‐protective	  and	  
reluctant	  to	  co-­‐operate,	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  reputational	  calculations.	  In	  other	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words,	  co-­‐operation	  is	  reputation-­‐conditioned:	  it	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  benefits	  co-­‐
operation	  can	  bring	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  unique	  reputation	  the	  agency	  maintains	  and	  
cultivates	  towards	  its	  key	  audience(s).	  Agencies	  are	  thus,	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  co-­‐
operative	  efforts	  when	  these	  bring	  gains	  to	  their	  organisational	  reputation—sustain	  
their	  ability	  to	  successfully	  carry	  out	  tasks	  that	  fall	  within	  their	  core	  role—	  without	  
threatening	  their	  organisational	  uniqueness	  (i.e.,	  reputation-­‐enhancing	  co-­‐operation	  
efforts).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  such	  a	  scenario,	  co-­‐operation	  would	  entail	  reputational	  
accrual	  without	  jeopardising	  the	  unique	  role	  of	  the	  organisation	  concerned.	  To	  the	  
contrary,	  an	  agency	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  display	  resistance	  to	  co-­‐operation	  efforts	  
that	  threaten	  its	  reputational	  uniqueness,	  as	  discussed	  above	  (i.e.,	  reputation-­‐
depleting	  co-­‐operation	  efforts).	  	  When	  faced	  with	  such	  co-­‐operation	  prospects,	  
agencies	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  display	  turf-­‐protective	  tendencies	  and	  a	  strong	  
reluctance	  to	  co-­‐operate.	  	  
	  
An	  agency	  would	  also	  be	  expected	  to	  forgo	  co-­‐operation	  on	  aspects	  that	  are	  directly	  
removed	  from	  its	  core	  functions	  and	  tasks	  	  (see	  also	  Gilad	  and	  Yogev	  2012)	  and	  thus,	  
not	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  protection	  and	  cultivation	  of	  its	  reputation	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  
its	  audience/s	  (i.e.,	  reputationally-­‐marginal	  co-­‐operative	  efforts).	  Agencies,	  we	  know,	  
‘avoid	  taking	  on	  new	  tasks	  that	  differ	  significantly	  from	  those	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
organization’s	  mission’	  (Wilson	  1989,	  p.	  190).	  Whether	  new	  tasks	  come	  by	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  co-­‐operation	  or	  by	  other	  means,	  such	  an	  approach	  seems	  likely	  since	  reputational	  
gains	  thus	  obtained	  would	  be	  trivial,	  yet	  they	  come	  with	  significant	  associated	  costs	  
(e.g.	  loss	  of	  control,	  inefficiencies	  or	  potential	  new	  rivals).	  	  
	  
What	  is	  more,	  agencies	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  particularly	  wary	  of	  such	  reputationally-­‐
marginal	  co-­‐operative	  efforts	  when	  these	  entail	  additional	  liabilities	  such	  as,	  for	  
instance,	  complex	  new	  tasks	  and/or	  salient	  ones	  (see	  Krause	  2003).	  As	  mentioned	  
above,	  agencies	  are	  evaluated	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  unique	  services	  capably,	  ‘by	  
avoiding	  visible	  failures’	  (Maor	  2013,	  p.	  6).	  Complexity	  for	  instance,	  can	  render	  it	  
difficult	  to	  demonstrate	  competence	  to	  successfully	  solve	  policy	  problems	  (Krause	  
2003).	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3.	  Data	  and	  Method	  
	  
Specifically	  set	  up	  to	  improve	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  in	  a	  multi-­‐level	  regulatory	  
context,	  and	  heavily	  dependent	  themselves	  on	  co-­‐operation	  from	  multiple	  national	  
bureaucratic	  structures	  themselves,	  European	  agencies	  make	  for	  textbook	  examples	  
for	  the	  study	  of	  multi-­‐level	  co-­‐operation	  at	  work.	  The	  research	  presented	  below	  
follows	  a	  most	  similar	  case	  study	  design	  i.e.,	  ‘two	  cases	  are	  apparently	  quite	  similar,	  
and	  yet	  demonstrate	  surprisingly	  different	  outcomes’	  (Gerring	  2007).	  It	  examines	  
two	  comparable	  European	  agencies	  (Europol	  and	  Frontex),	  yet	  which	  display	  
differing	  co-­‐operation	  outcomes,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  more	  at	  length	  below	  (section	  
4).	  
	  
Both	  agencies	  operate	  in	  highly	  contentious	  and	  sensitive	  policy	  areas	  from	  a	  
member	  state	  perspective,	  strongly	  interlinked	  to	  national	  sovereignty.	  The	  said	  
organisational	  predisposition	  towards	  ‘turf	  protection’	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  
particularly	  emphasized	  in	  such	  cases,	  with	  an	  ensuing	  reluctance	  to	  co-­‐operate	  by	  
national	  structures.	  Yet	  interestingly	  enough,	  the	  outcome	  (i.e.,	  co-­‐operation)	  in	  the	  
two	  cases—gaged	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  secondary	  literature	  analysing	  national-­‐
level	  involvement	  in	  core	  agency	  mandated	  tasks	  requiring	  such	  co-­‐operation	  (and	  
corroborated	  through	  interviews)—has	  been	  divergent.	  Frontex,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
has	  benefitted	  from	  member	  state	  co-­‐operation	  and	  support	  post-­‐delegation.	  
Europol	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  suffered	  from	  significant	  co-­‐operation	  difficulties,	  
being	  faced	  since	  its	  creation	  with	  a	  strong	  reluctance	  by	  national	  forces	  to	  co-­‐
operate	  and	  a	  general	  resistance	  to	  Europol	  as	  an	  organisation,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  below.	  	  
	  
The	  premise	  underlying	  this	  article	  is	  that	  the	  different	  outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  
are	  strongly	  related	  to	  reputational	  calculations.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  other	  co-­‐
operation	  determinants	  do	  not	  play	  a	  part	  as	  well;	  but	  rather,	  that	  organizational	  
reputational	  concerns	  are	  crucial	  in	  shaping	  co-­‐operation	  behaviour	  in	  the	  two	  cases.	  	  
On-­‐going	  empirical	  developments	  allow	  for	  strengthening	  the	  claim	  against	  
alternative	  determinants	  (e.g.	  different	  functional	  needs,	  fields	  of	  operation,	  
resource	  differences	  etc.)	  as	  primary	  explanatory	  factors	  of	  the	  divergent	  outcomes	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in	  the	  two	  cases.	  In	  the	  Frontex	  case,	  developments,	  which	  would	  reverse	  the	  co-­‐
operation-­‐reputation	  patterns	  along	  similar	  lines	  as	  in	  the	  Europol	  case	  are	  being	  
envisaged.	  This	  affords	  us	  a	  glimpse	  of	  what	  would	  happen	  within	  the	  same	  case	  
(i.e.,	  Frontex)	  if	  we	  were	  to	  flip	  the	  reputational	  benefits	  —all	  other	  factors	  staying	  
the	  same.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  below,	  we	  then	  see	  similar	  turf-­‐protective	  tendencies	  
emerging,	  as	  in	  the	  Europol	  case,	  strengthening	  the	  case	  for	  co-­‐operation	  patterns	  
being	  strongly	  shaped	  by	  reputational	  considerations.	  	  
	  
The	  article	  draws	  on	  (legal	  and	  policy)	  documents	  and	  interview	  material.	  The	  
interview	  data	  consists	  of	  21	  semi-­‐structured	  expert	  interviews	  with	  EU	  and	  
national-­‐level	  respondents	  from/working	  with	  Frontex	  and	  Europol.	  The	  respondent	  
sample	  consists	  of	  high-­‐level	  agency	  respondents	  (such	  as	  agency	  directors,	  
directorate	  staff,	  and	  heads	  and	  staff	  of	  key	  operational	  units)	  and	  members	  of	  the	  
management	  boards	  of	  the	  two	  agencies,	  which	  are	  generally	  the	  heads	  of	  
corresponding	  national-­‐level	  agencies.	  It	  includes	  five	  agency	  directors:	  the	  
incumbent	  executive	  directors	  of	  the	  two	  agencies,	  a	  former	  executive	  director	  of	  
Europoli,	  as	  well	  as	  two	  former	  deputy	  directors.	  The	  interviews	  were	  taped	  and	  
transcribed;	  interview	  quotes	  are	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  main	  points.	  Each	  respondent	  
was	  assigned	  an	  interviewee	  number,	  and	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  such	  in	  the	  text,	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  preserving	  his	  or	  her	  anonymity.	  
	  
4.	  Multi-­‐Level	  Police	  and	  Border	  Management	  Co-­‐operation	  
	  
4.1.	  Alike…	   	  
	  
Europol	  and	  Frontex	  are	  two	  agencies	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  operating	  in	  the	  Area	  
of	  Freedom	  Security	  and	  Justice	  (AFSJ),	  exercising	  mandates	  in	  the	  field	  of	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  external	  border	  management,	  respectively.	  Europol	  was	  set	  up	  in	  
1995,	  through	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Europol	  Convention	  (replaced	  in	  2010	  by	  the	  
Europol	  Council	  Decisionii)	  and	  Frontex	  in	  2004,	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Frontex	  
Regulation.iii	  Both	  agencies	  are	  organisationally	  separate	  from	  the	  EU	  institutions,	  
they	  have	  their	  own	  budget	  (funded	  from	  EU	  contributions)	  and	  are	  endowed	  with	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legal	  personality.	  Their	  mandates	  are	  to	  improve	  operational	  co-­‐operation	  among	  
national	  authorities	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  prevent	  and	  combat	  organised	  crime,	  terrorism	  
and	  other	  forms	  of	  serious	  crime	  (Europol)	  and	  to	  strengthen	  external	  border	  
controls	  (Frontex).	  
	  
The	  driving	  forces	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  both	  agencies	  have	  been	  broadly	  similar:	  a	  
perceived	  need	  for	  closer	  co-­‐operation	  among	  the	  EU	  member	  states,	  faced	  with	  
growing	  challenges	  of	  transnational	  character	  (i.e.,	  serious	  crime	  and	  illegal	  
migration,	  respectively)	  and	  spurred	  on	  by	  a	  series	  of	  high	  impact	  events	  (e.g.	  the	  fall	  
of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  EU’s	  Eastern	  enlargement)	  or	  crises	  (e.g.	  9/11	  terrorist	  attacks)	  
(Den	  Boer	  and	  Walker	  1993;	  Monar	  2005;	  Leonard	  2009;	  Groenleer	  2009;	  Busuioc	  et	  
al.	  2011;	  Perkowski	  2012).	  In	  this	  context,	  loose	  co-­‐operation	  efforts	  of	  a	  bilateral	  
and/or	  strictly	  intergovernmental	  nature	  were	  no	  longer	  regarded	  as	  sufficient,	  and	  
more	  permanent,	  enhanced	  supranational	  structures	  of	  co-­‐operation	  became	  
necessary	  to	  address	  common	  problems.	  
	  
Although	  border	  management	  has	  seen	  deeper	  integration	  than	  law	  enforcement,	  
both	  policy	  areas	  remain	  highly	  sensitive	  and	  contentious	  from	  a	  national	  
perspective,	  and	  integration	  efforts	  have	  been	  piecemeal	  and	  controversial.	  Given	  
the	  delicate	  nature	  of	  the	  tasks	  at	  stake,	  national	  bureaucracies	  have	  been	  
protective	  of	  their	  prerogatives	  in	  these	  areas.	  Keen	  to	  maintain	  control	  post	  
delegation,	  both	  EU	  agencies’	  management	  boards	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  made	  up	  
of	  national	  representatives	  i.e.,	  they	  are	  composed	  of	  one	  representative	  from	  each	  
member	  state,	  together	  with	  the	  European	  Commission	  (one	  representative	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Europol	  and	  two	  for	  Frontex).	  Also	  part	  of	  the	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  national	  
control	  and	  pointing	  at	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  both	  fields,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  was	  
kept	  outside	  the	  set	  up	  process	  of	  both	  agencies,	  with	  its	  amendments	  being	  ignored	  
by	  the	  Council	  (Den	  Boer	  2002;	  Curtin	  2005;	  Peers	  2005;	  Leonard	  2009).	  
	  
Both	  agencies	  are	  operational-­‐co-­‐operation	  agencies	  in	  nature	  and	  their	  mandates	  
revolve	  around	  improved	  co-­‐operation	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  drafting/adoption	  of	  
common	  rules).	  Europol’s	  tasks	  are	  centred	  on	  the	  gathering,	  exchange	  and	  analysis	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of	  information	  and	  intelligence	  received	  from	  national	  police	  authorities	  (but	  also	  
third	  states,	  other	  EU	  and	  international	  bodies),	  through	  the	  mediation	  of	  a	  network	  
of	  liaison	  officers	  and	  complex	  information	  exchange	  systems.	  	  Europol	  has	  its	  own	  
officers	  with	  limited	  operational	  powers,	  primarily	  centred	  on	  supporting	  and	  co-­‐
ordinating	  investigations.	  The	  agency	  can	  ask	  national	  police	  authorities	  to	  initiate,	  
conduct	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	  investigations	  and	  its	  officers	  can	  participate	  in	  joint	  
operations	  with	  national	  authorities,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Joint	  Investigation	  Teams	  (JITs).	  
Europol	  officers	  cannot	  however,	  carry	  guns,	  conduct	  searches	  or	  use	  force	  
(Groenleer	  2009).	  
	  
	  Frontex’	  tasks	  range	  from	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  conduct	  of	  joint	  border	  operations,	  
deploying	  joint	  member	  states’	  staff	  and	  equipment	  at	  the	  external	  borders	  (land,	  
sea,	  air),	  to	  carrying	  out	  risk	  analysis	  or	  assisting	  member	  states	  in	  the	  training	  of	  
national	  border	  guards.	  The	  agency	  manages	  the	  so-­‐called	  European	  Border	  Guard	  
Teams	  (EBGT),	  a	  pooled	  resource	  of	  national	  border	  guards	  kept	  in	  full	  readiness	  for	  
deployment	  in	  joint	  operations	  and	  rapid	  border	  crisis	  interventions.	  Under	  the	  aegis	  
of	  Frontex,	  border	  guards	  from	  various	  EU	  member	  states	  act	  in	  the	  same	  capacity	  as	  
national	  border	  guards.	  They	  can	  carry	  guns,	  ammunition	  and	  equipment	  as	  well	  as	  
use	  force	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  member	  state	  (i.e.,	  the	  host	  member	  state),	  which	  is	  
not	  their	  own,	  albeit	  subject	  to	  restrictions.	  	  
	  
Horizontal	  and	  vertical	  co-­‐operation	  is	  thus	  crucial	  to	  both	  agencies’	  functioning	  and	  
ability	  to	  deliver	  and	  to	  fulfil	  their	  mandate,	  an	  issue	  both	  agencies	  are	  intensely	  
aware	  of.	  As	  observed	  by	  a	  Europol	  director:	  ‘We	  couldn’t	  function	  without	  the	  flow	  
of	  information	  from	  the	  member	  states’	  (Respondent	  #5).	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  high-­‐	  
level	  Frontex	  respondent	  (European	  Parliament	  report	  2011):	  ‘I	  have	  said	  many	  
times	  that	  Frontex	  is	  nothing	  without	  the	  member	  states.	  And	  asking	  and	  tasking	  
Frontex	  to	  do	  more	  is	  to	  ask	  the	  member	  states	  to	  do	  more.	  The	  business	  that	  we	  
are	  in	  is	  operational	  co-­‐operation	  among	  the	  border	  security	  authorities.’	  Whereas	  
both	  agencies	  are	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  co-­‐operation	  from	  national	  authorities,	  and	  
whereas	  this	  is	  in	  some	  cases	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  both	  agencies’	  constituent	  acts	  as	  a	  
formal	  obligation	  (’shall’)	  on	  the	  part	  of	  national	  authorities	  to	  participate	  and	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engage	  in	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  agency	  products	  and	  activitiesiv,	  the	  two	  agencies	  cannot	  
actually	  oblige	  member	  state	  authorities	  to	  follow	  through	  and	  are	  dependent	  on	  
their	  willingness	  to	  co-­‐operate.	  
	  
4.2.	  Yet	  Different	  Co-­‐operation	  Outcomes	  
	  
EU	  trans-­‐national	  police	  co-­‐operation	  has	  been	  ‘plagued’	  from	  its	  very	  establishment	  
by	  a	  strong	  resistance	  from	  national	  structures	  to	  co-­‐operate:	  ‘Initially,	  Europol	  faced	  
a	  lack	  of	  co-­‐operation	  from	  national	  police	  authorities,	  reluctant	  to	  share	  
information	  (…)’	  (Groenleer	  2009,	  p.	  277)	  and	  ‘the	  office	  still	  faces	  a	  lack	  of	  
collaboration	  from	  national	  police	  services’	  (Groenleer	  2009,	  p.	  296).	  While	  co-­‐
operation	  efforts	  in	  the	  field	  have	  generally	  benefitted	  from	  considerable	  support	  at	  
the	  high	  political	  level,	  with	  recurrent	  increases	  in	  Europol’s	  mandate	  and	  budget,	  
the	  agency’s	  struggles	  to	  obtain	  support	  and	  co-­‐operation	  from	  national	  law	  
enforcement	  agencies	  are	  extensively	  documented	  empirically	  in	  the	  literature	  along	  
the	  years	  (Zanders	  2002;	  Den	  Boer	  and	  Bruggeman	  2007;	  Groenleer	  2009;	  Busuioc	  
2010;	  Busuioc	  et	  al.	  2011).	  This	  has	  led	  to	  ‘a	  wide	  gap	  in	  support	  between	  the	  
political	  and	  bureaucratic	  and	  professional	  level’	  (Groenleer	  2009).	  
	  
Poor	  co-­‐operation	  has	  manifested	  itself	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  supply	  of	  
information	  by	  national	  offices,	  the	  very	  ‘lifeblood’	  of	  Europol,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  
poor	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  at	  the	  operational	  level.	  In	  terms	  of	  information	  
input,	  national	  offices	  have	  been	  extremely	  guarded	  about	  sharing	  information	  with	  
Europol	  and	  have	  preferred	  to	  co-­‐operate	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case,	  bi-­‐lateral	  basis	  (House	  
of	  Lords	  2008).	  As	  reportedly	  observed	  by	  a	  Europol	  director:	  	  ‘I	  cannot	  influence	  the	  
member	  states	  to	  insert	  more	  data.	  I	  appeal,	  I	  remind	  them	  all	  the	  time	  and	  now	  
they	  are	  getting	  very	  tired.	  (…)	  The	  system	  is	  by	  far	  not	  filled	  as	  it	  should	  be’	  (Busuioc	  
2013,	  p.	  147).	  A	  Europol	  director	  similarly	  observed	  in	  2011:	  ‘it’s	  [information	  
exchange]	  still	  an	  issue,	  and	  it’s	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  that	  Europol	  has	  always	  had	  
for	  the	  last	  twenty	  years’	  (Respondent	  #5).	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On	  the	  operational	  side,	  in	  terms	  of	  joint	  investigations,	  the	  instrument	  has	  been	  
and	  continues	  to	  be	  considerably	  underused	  (Gualtieri	  2007;	  Busuioc	  2013).	  In	  the	  
words	  of	  the	  same	  director:	  ‘JITS	  have	  not	  been	  an	  unqualified	  success,	  since	  they	  
were	  introduced	  10	  years	  ago.	  For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  but	  it	  clearly	  hasn’t	  taken	  off	  
still,	  which	  is	  a	  shame	  because	  they	  have	  great	  potential’	  (Respondent	  #5).	  On	  
terrorism	  co-­‐operation,	  he	  similarly	  noted:	  ‘we	  have	  developed	  counter-­‐terrorism	  
resources	  (…)	  But	  that’s	  simply	  not	  used	  at	  the	  level	  that	  they	  could	  be.	  There	  are	  50	  
terrorism	  experts	  here,	  specialist	  databases	  and	  they	  are	  used	  more	  than	  they	  were,	  
but	  are	  still	  operating	  at	  a	  suboptimal	  capacity.	  It	  actually	  brings	  into	  quite	  sharp	  
relief	  an	  interesting	  issue	  about	  aligning	  political	  expectations,	  with	  practitioner	  
reality	  (…).’	  
	  
What	  is	  perhaps	  surprising	  is	  that,	  by	  comparison,	  EU	  border	  management	  co-­‐
operation	  has	  been	  largely	  qualified	  as	  successful.	  Frontex	  has	  benefitted	  not	  only	  
from	  high-­‐level	  political	  support	  (Pollack	  and	  Slominski	  2009,	  p.	  904)—as	  evidenced	  
by	  the	  expansion	  in	  its	  mandate	  as	  well	  as	  sky-­‐rocketing	  budget	  and	  staff	  
increasesv—but	  also	  from	  close	  co-­‐operation	  from	  national	  structures.	  The	  co-­‐
operation	  of	  national	  border	  guard	  authorities	  has	  taken	  place	  across	  the	  full	  range	  
of	  the	  agency’s	  mandate:	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  information,	  participation	  and	  
requests	  for	  new	  joint	  operations,	  pooling	  of	  staff,	  technical	  equipment	  and	  
resources	  etc.,	  albeit	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  this	  respect	  among	  member	  states	  
(Respondents	  #8;	  first	  interview	  2011;	  second	  interview	  2013;	  #15;	  #18;	  #20;	  COWI	  
2009;	  Pollack	  and	  Slominski	  2009).	  Pollack	  and	  Slominski	  (2009,	  p.	  912)	  for	  instance,	  
note	  that	  ‘[d]espite	  the	  short	  time	  of	  activity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  delicate	  nature	  of	  its	  
operations,	  Frontex	  has	  shown	  considerable	  activity	  covering	  and	  increasing	  number	  
of	  fields	  of	  border	  management	  and	  involving	  and	  increasing	  number	  of	  member	  
states.	  (…)	  This	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  overall	  increase	  of	  its	  activities	  in	  terms	  of	  
range,	  duration,	  intensity	  and	  involvement	  of	  member	  states.’	  
	  
The	  agency’s	  independent	  external	  evaluation	  found	  that	  ‘most	  Member	  States	  have	  
a	  positive	  attitude	  towards	  JO	  [joint	  operations]’	  (COWI	  2009,	  p.	  40).	  It	  observed	  that	  
‘In	  terms	  of	  operational	  impact,	  there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  increased	  cooperation	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between	  Member	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  scale	  of	  cooperation	  (number	  of	  countries	  
involved)	  and	  number	  of	  operations.	  Without	  Frontex	  this	  would	  not	  be	  the	  case’	  
(COWI	  2009,	  p.	  42).	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  area	  of	  risk	  analysis,	  the	  same	  report	  found	  that	  
‘The	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  RA	  [risk	  analysis]	  amongst	  e-­‐survey	  respondents	  is	  high	  
with	  70%	  giving	  a	  positive	  or	  very	  positive	  overall	  score	  (…)’	  (COWI	  2009,	  p.	  47).	  It	  
concluded	  that	  the	  ‘structure	  of	  communication	  set	  up	  by	  Frontex	  for	  consultation	  
and	  cooperation	  with	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  field	  of	  risk	  analysis	  is	  functioning	  well.	  It	  
helps	  in	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  partnership	  in	  RA	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  improves	  the	  exchange	  
of	  information’	  (COWI	  2009,	  p.	  48).	  This	  was	  also	  corroborated	  in	  recent	  interviews	  
conducted	  for	  this	  study.	  To	  illustrate,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  a	  Frontex	  director:	  	  
The	  activity	  and	  the	  level	  of	  activeness	  of	  member	  states	  has	  developed	  
positively	  year	  after	  year.	  I	  am	  happy	  man	  to	  see	  that	  the	  management	  board	  
of	  Frontex,	  that	  consists	  of	  the	  heads	  of	  national	  boarder	  guard	  services,	  
don’t	  consider	  Frontex	  as	  a	  pain,	  or	  some	  kind	  of	  obligation,	  or	  a	  burden	  or	  a	  
competitor.	  (Respondent	  #8,	  second	  interview	  2013)	  
	  
In	  the	  section	  below,	  an	  attempt	  will	  be	  made	  to	  help	  elucidate	  some	  of	  the	  
observed	  discrepancies	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  introduced	  earlier.	  
	  
5.	  To	  Co-­‐operate	  or	  not	  to	  Co-­‐operate?	  A	  Product	  of	  ‘Turf’	  and	  Reputational	  
Calculations	  
	  
While	  the	  differing	  co-­‐operation	  outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  seem	  baffling	  at	  the	  first	  
sight,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  how	  organisational	  reputation	  is	  maintained	  and	  accrued	  in	  
both	  fields	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  crucial	  role	  played	  by	  reputation	  in	  shaping	  co-­‐
operation	  outcomes.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  other	  factors,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  do	  
not	  potentially	  intercede	  as	  well	  in	  fostering	  or	  discouraging	  co-­‐operation.	  And	  in	  
fact,	  we	  will	  see	  below	  inter-­‐dependence	  play	  a	  role	  for	  instance,	  in	  national	  co-­‐
operation	  with	  Frontex	  (albeit	  working	  through	  bureaucratic	  reputation).	  But	  rather,	  
that	  reputation	  is	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  explanation.	  And	  that	  de-­‐constructing	  
reputation	  processes	  can	  be	  important	  for	  understanding	  why	  turf-­‐protective	  
tendencies—and	  an	  ensuing	  reluctance	  to	  co-­‐operate—become	  manifest	  in	  some	  
cases,	  and	  less	  so	  in	  others.	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5.1.	  Not	  to	  Co-­‐operate:	  Law	  Enforcement,	  a	  Case	  of	  Turf-­‐Protectionism	  
	  
While	  the	  rise	  in	  transnational	  crime	  requires	  a	  transnational	  response,	  most	  crime	  
does	  not	  actually	  have	  a	  transnational	  element,	  but	  instead	  it	  still	  largely	  occurs	  
within	  a	  national	  context.	  Most	  law	  enforcement	  and	  prosecutorial	  powers	  continue	  
to	  be	  located	  at	  the	  national	  level	  and	  national	  police	  authorities’	  ‘regulatory	  
dominion’	  pertains	  to	  tackling	  crime	  within	  the	  national	  territory.	  Police	  officers	  are	  
assessed	  and	  rewarded	  for	  fighting	  crime	  effectively	  within	  the	  communities	  they	  
serve,	  rather	  than	  across	  national	  borders:	  ‘police	  forces	  in	  Europe	  are	  foremost	  
nationally	  or	  even	  regionally	  or	  locally	  oriented’	  (Groenleer	  2009,	  p.	  297).	  In	  other	  
words,	  reputation—bureaucratic	  and	  individual—is	  built	  in	  this	  case	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  key	  
national	  and	  local	  audience(s)	  by	  fighting	  crime	  in	  a	  national	  context.	  It	  is	  strongly,	  or	  
nearly	  exclusively,	  oriented	  towards	  policing	  activities	  of	  a	  local	  or	  national	  
significance.	  
	  
Institutionalised	  supranational	  co-­‐operation	  therefore,	  entails	  a	  loss	  of	  control	  by	  
national	  forces	  of	  key	  reputational	  sources	  to	  a	  new	  bureaucratic	  rival—Europol.	  
First	  of	  all,	  sharing	  information	  with	  Europol	  in	  an	  ongoing,	  institutionalised	  basis	  
essentially	  empowers	  Europol,	  while	  potentially,	  albeit	  not	  purposefully,	  
compromising	  a	  key	  resource	  of	  national	  offices:	  (intelligence)	  data.	  In	  this	  
connection,	  a	  respondent	  spoke	  of:	  
A	  tendency	  of	  policemen	  to	  say:	  “it’s	  my	  data”,	  afraid	  that	  the	  data	  would	  be	  
corrupted	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  undercover	  operation	  or	  that	  
someone	  else	  would	  investigate	  on	  his	  case	  and	  the	  case	  would	  be	  burnt.	  
(Respondent	  #16)	  
	  
What	  is	  more,	  drawing	  on	  data	  gathered	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  the	  European	  agency	  
could	  get	  involved	  in	  specific	  national	  cases,	  or	  even	  worse	  from	  a	  national	  authority	  
perspective,	  actually	  solve	  them.	  Closing	  cases	  at	  the	  national	  level	  is	  an	  important	  
reputational	  source	  of	  national	  police	  authorities—and	  their	  officers,	  with	  arrest	  and	  
clearance	  rates	  traditionally	  relied	  upon	  as	  indicators	  in	  assessing	  police	  
performance.	  A	  supranational	  authority	  solving	  relevant	  cases	  can	  interfere	  with	  the	  
‘reputational	  uniqueness’	  of	  national	  offices,	  with	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  a	  unique	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public	  service.	  Supranational	  co-­‐operation	  efforts	  are	  thus	  perceived	  as	  reputation-­‐
depleting,	  triggering	  customary	  turf-­‐protective	  tendencies.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  
respondent:	  
Too	  often	  the	  national	  authorities	  of	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  consider	  Europol	  
as	  a	  competitor.	  And	  that	  is	  the	  core	  problem	  why	  they	  don’t	  give	  Europol	  
the	  information	  that	  they	  should	  receive.	  (…)	  Because	  of	  one	  of	  the	  unwritten	  
rules	  in	  law	  enforcement.	  Who	  is	  the	  hero	  in	  law	  enforcement?	  It’s	  the	  guy	  
who	  solves	  the	  case.	  That’s	  the	  point.	  (…)	  And	  if	  you	  give	  the	  information	  to	  
your	  co-­‐operative	  partner,	  you	  give	  the	  list	  of	  names	  and	  telephone	  numbers,	  
who	  after	  2-­‐3	  months	  says,	  “I	  did	  it,	  I	  solved	  the	  case,	  I’m	  the	  hero.”	  
	  
And	  again	  ‘They	  are	  afraid	  that	  by	  co-­‐operating	  someone	  will	  steal	  the	  case’	  
(Respondent	  #6);	  ‘I	  want	  to	  have	  all	  the	  credit	  from	  this	  one’	  (Respondent	  #19).	  	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  therefore	  that	  Europol’s	  databases	  are	  underused—
suffering	  from	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘information	  dehydration’	  (Respondent	  #6)—as	  are	  its	  JIT	  
instruments,	  as	  discussed	  above.	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  agency	  respondents	  
interviewed	  recurrently	  spoke	  of	  competitive	  and	  ‘turf-­‐protectionist’	  tendencies	  
among	  national	  law	  enforcement	  authorities.	  
A	  Europol	  director	  told	  of:	  
A	  certain	  cultural	  resistance	  in	  the	  police	  community	  to	  sharing	  their	  
information	  with	  Europol.	  (…)	  we	  had	  it	  across	  all	  areas	  of	  our	  work.	  And	  it’s	  
convincing	  what	  is	  normally	  a	  conservatively-­‐minded	  police	  audience	  in	  
Europol	  that	  it	  is	  safe,	  secure	  and	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  added	  value	  for	  them	  if	  they	  
can	  cooperate	  with	  Europol.	  (…).	  And	  it’s	  breaking	  into	  that	  police	  culture	  
that	  it’s	  now	  the	  challenge	  for	  us.	  (Respondent	  #5)	  
	  
This	  echoes	  the	  observations	  of	  Patrick	  Zanders,	  the	  Belgian	  representative	  in	  the	  
management	  board	  of	  Europol	  in	  2002,	  who	  then	  publicly	  and	  critically	  noted:	  
‘national	  police	  services	  prefer	  to	  run	  the	  information	  and	  investigation	  themselves	  
with	  the	  sole	  object	  to	  pat	  oneself	  on	  the	  back	  (me-­‐culture).	  This	  culture	  should	  
change	  into	  a	  European	  “we-­‐culture”	  in	  which	  a	  common	  quest	  for	  security	  output	  
becomes	  more	  important	  than	  the	  personal	  or	  corps	  interest’	  (Zanders	  2002).	  
	  
Moreover,	  given	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  reputation	  is	  accrued	  in	  the	  field	  of	  law	  
enforcement,	  supranational	  co-­‐operation	  can	  only	  bring	  marginal	  reputational	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benefits	  to	  the	  national	  authorities	  involved	  (reputationally-­‐marginal	  co-­‐operative	  
efforts).	  As	  discussed	  above,	  such	  co-­‐operation	  efforts—sending	  data	  to	  Europol,	  
participating	  in	  joint	  cross-­‐border	  operations—	  might	  well	  result	  into	  Europol	  
successes	  but	  would	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  into	  organisational	  (or	  even	  individual)	  
reputational	  gains	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Even	  in	  the	  fewer	  circumstances	  when	  a	  case	  
does	  have	  transnational	  elements,	  Europol	  respondents	  refer	  to	  a	  reluctance	  of	  
national	  police	  forces	  to	  engage	  in	  co-­‐operation	  for	  ‘fear	  that	  the	  case	  would	  
become	  too	  complex’	  (Respondent	  #14).	  International	  co-­‐operation	  adds	  a	  new	  layer	  
of	  complexity	  as	  well	  as	  placing	  relevant	  issues	  outside	  national	  offices’	  direct	  
control.	  This	  can	  interfere	  with	  national	  offices’	  ability	  to	  do	  things	  capably,	  a	  crucial	  
aspect	  of	  reputation-­‐building	  efforts.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  Europol	  respondent:	  
They	  [national	  investigators]	  just	  want	  to	  close	  their	  case.	  If	  they	  send	  the	  
information	  to	  us,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  we	  find	  something	  and	  the	  investigation	  
becomes	  too	  difficult—too	  many	  other	  leads	  in	  too	  many	  other	  countries.	  It	  
is	  easier	  to	  keep	  it	  simple.	  (Respondent	  #16)	  
	  
And	  again,	  ‘There	  is	  a	  mentality	  of	  “What’s	  in	  it	  for	  me?	  I	  keep	  to	  the	  borders	  of	  my	  
country.	  That	  will	  make	  my	  life	  easier”’(Respondent	  #14).	  
	  
Moreover,	  when	  necessary	  in	  specific	  cases,	  the	  gains	  of	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  
(i.e.,	  access	  to	  information,	  joint	  operational	  co-­‐operation)	  can	  often	  be	  obtained	  on	  
a	  case-­‐by	  case	  bilateral	  basis,	  bypassing	  institutionalised	  structures	  of	  co-­‐operation.	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  gains	  are	  often	  not	  exclusive	  and	  can	  be	  accessed	  without	  having	  
to	  engage	  in	  institutionalised	  supranational	  co-­‐operation	  through	  formal	  Europol	  
structures:	  ‘what	  works	  is	  the	  old	  boys’	  network’	  (Respondent	  #14).	  Temporary,	  
informal	  co-­‐operation,	  outside	  Europol	  structures,	  affords	  the	  possibility	  to	  avoid	  
some	  of	  the	  reputational	  costs	  associated	  with	  institutionalised	  co-­‐operation	  e.g.	  
relinquishing—	  by	  default—	  control	  over	  data	  and	  potentially	  losing	  cases.	  	  
	  
And	  sure	  enough,	  national	  police	  offices	  have	  preferred,	  when	  necessary,	  to	  co-­‐
operate	  bilaterally	  in	  an	  informal	  manner,	  bypassing	  formal	  structures.	  For	  instance,	  
it	  has	  been	  observed	  that:	  ‘the	  vast	  majority	  of	  information	  exchanges	  between	  
liaison	  bureaux	  occurs	  outside	  the	  formal	  systems,	  and	  thus	  while	  providing	  very	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significant	  benefit	  to	  participating	  countries	  the	  main	  loser	  is	  Europol	  (…)	  It	  is	  
reported	  that	  up	  to	  80%	  of	  bilateral	  exchanges	  occurs	  this	  way’	  (House	  of	  Lords	  
2008).	  Member	  states	  can	  also	  set	  up	  JITs	  without	  the	  involvement	  of	  Europol	  ‘and	  
most	  of	  them	  don’t	  involve	  Europol’	  (Respondent	  #16).	  	  
	  
Pre-­‐empting	  turf-­‐protective	  tendencies	  among	  national	  authorities	  becomes	  
increasingly	  difficult.	  To	  stimulate	  co-­‐operation,	  Europol,	  like	  Frontex,	  cannot	  
actually	  oblige	  national	  authorities	  to	  co-­‐operate.	  In	  a	  complex	  regulatory	  system	  
such	  as	  the	  EU,	  decisions	  to	  co-­‐operate	  are	  often	  made	  at	  the	  top	  of	  political	  
hierarchies	  (Council-­‐level	  in	  this	  case),	  to	  be	  implemented	  downward	  by	  the	  
composite	  elements	  of	  the	  multi-­‐level	  system:	  national	  bureaucracies	  amongst	  each	  
other	  and	  in	  co-­‐operation	  with	  EU-­‐level	  actors.	  The	  supranational	  level,	  as	  seen	  in	  
this	  case,	  often	  lacks	  the	  authority	  and	  the	  instruments	  needed	  to	  actually	  ensure	  
compliance	  with	  co-­‐operation	  mandates	  at	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  governance	  and/or	  
the	  willingness	  to	  enforce	  these	  for	  fear	  of	  alienating	  national	  authorities.	  Instead,	  
agencies	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  informal	  influence	  to	  instil	  co-­‐operation	  downward,	  within	  
this	  composite	  system.	  Europol	  has	  placed	  an	  emphasis	  on	  ‘communicating	  success’,	  
on	  persuading	  through	  demonstrating	  added	  value:	  ‘since	  recently,	  Europol	  has	  been	  
treating	  successful	  operations	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  boost	  its	  image’	  (Groenleer	  2009,	  
p.	  286).	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  deliberate	  strategy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  agency	  to	  break	  through	  national	  turf-­‐
protectionist	  tendencies	  and	  align	  top-­‐level	  political	  decisions	  with	  lower	  level	  
practices.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  Europol	  director:	  
How	  can	  we	  do	  that	  [engender	  co-­‐operation]?	  Through	  success.	  Through	  
demonstrating	  that	  the	  system	  works.	  (Respondent	  #5)	  
	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  another	  director:	  
Europol	  will	  not	  be	  harassing	  the	  member	  states	  for	  information,	  
continuously	  requesting	  information	  (…)	  Europol	  will	  prove	  its	  value	  added,	  
its	  credibility,	  by	  leading	  by	  example.	  (Respondent	  #2)	  
	  
The	  agency	  has	  purposefully	  steered	  clear	  of	  more	  aggressive	  communication	  means	  
i.e.,	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  through	  providing	  statistics	  of	  contributions	  of	  various	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member	  states	  and	  identifying	  co-­‐operation	  ‘laggards’.	  Such	  a	  strategy	  is	  generally	  
regarded	  as	  politically	  incorrect	  by	  Europol	  for	  fear	  that	  it	  would	  further	  alienate	  
national	  authorities:	  
No	  statistics	  are	  available	  (…)	  We	  advise	  against	  taking	  up	  a	  quantitative	  
assessment	  approach.	  (Respondent	  #14)	  
	  
It’s	  not	  the	  right	  approach	  for	  us.	  I	  catch	  more	  flies	  with	  honey	  than	  with	  
vinegar.	  (Respondent	  #16).	  
	  
The	  role	  of	  communication	  in	  bringing	  the	  various	  organisational	  levels	  in	  alignment	  
with	  decisions	  adopted	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  organisational	  hierarchies	  is	  well-­‐recognised	  
in	  organisation	  theory	  (Simon	  1944;	  1997).	  In	  this	  case	  however,	  Europol’s	  informal	  
efforts	  to	  influence	  national-­‐level	  behaviour	  are	  not	  aligned	  to	  how	  co-­‐operation	  is	  
actually	  accrued	  by	  the	  national	  authorities,	  and	  the	  police	  officers,	  they	  are	  trying	  
to	  reach.	  They	  are	  not	  tuned	  in	  to	  the	  key	  role	  played	  by	  reputation	  in	  conditioning	  
perceptions	  of	  co-­‐operation.	  Though	  ‘communicating	  success’	  Europol	  may	  well	  be	  
trying	  to	  entice	  national	  authorities	  with	  a	  good	  serving	  of	  ‘vinegar’	  instead	  of	  the	  
proverbial	  ‘honey’,	  mentioned	  by	  the	  respondent	  above.	  Given	  that	  the	  bureaucratic	  
reputation	  of	  national	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  is	  linked	  to	  them	  effectively	  
fighting	  crime,	  solving	  cases	  at	  the	  local/national	  level,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  a	  strategy	  
of	  communicating	  supranational	  ‘success’	  is	  potentially	  self-­‐defeating.	  It	  comes	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  being	  perceived	  as	  infringing	  national	  authorities’	  ‘turf’—solving	  their	  
cases	  with	  their	  hard-­‐won	  data—summoning	  or	  reinforcing	  turf-­‐protective	  
tendencies	  on	  their	  part.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  respondent:	  
The	  more	  successful	  Europol	  is,	  which	  is	  pending	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  
information	  and	  intelligence	  that	  they	  gather,	  the	  less	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  it’s	  the	  
member	  state	  authorities	  who	  alone	  solved	  the	  case.	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  informal	  attempts	  of	  organisational	  influence	  towards	  co-­‐operation,	  
which	  are	  not	  mindful	  or	  aligned	  to	  how	  reputation	  is	  built	  by	  the	  different	  
organisational	  (sub-­‐)units	  risk	  missing	  their	  aim	  or	  even	  become	  counter-­‐productive.	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5.2.	  To	  Co-­‐operate:	  Border	  Management,	  a	  Case	  of	  Reputation-­‐	  Enhancing	  Co-­‐
operation	  
	  
The	  Schengen	  Agreement	  (1985)	  and	  the	  Schengen	  Convention	  (1990)	  implementing	  
itvi	  —now	  incorporated	  in	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  European	  Union	  law—resulted	  in	  the	  
gradual	  abolition	  of	  internal	  borders	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  Europe’s	  borderless	  
Schengen	  Area	  within	  common	  external	  borders.	  With	  the	  removal	  of	  internal	  
border	  checks,	  national	  border	  authorities	  are	  facing	  increased	  pressures	  rendering	  
trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  an	  important	  element	  to	  the	  successful	  fulfilment	  of	  
their	  core	  tasks.	  While	  under	  Schengen,	  national	  border	  authorities	  remain	  
responsible	  for	  their	  borders—by	  law,	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  control	  and	  
surveillance	  of	  the	  EU	  external	  borders	  lies	  with	  the	  national	  authority	  in	  question,	  
integration	  in	  this	  area	  has	  nevertheless,	  created	  strong	  inter-­‐dependencies.	  Actions	  
of	  one	  organisational	  actor	  in	  the	  system	  influence	  the	  performance	  and	  reputation	  
of	  other	  actors,	  and	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  becomes	  central	  to	  bureaucratic	  
efforts	  to	  capably	  discharge	  their	  core	  mission.	  	  
	  
First	  of	  all,	  national	  Schengen	  authorities	  that	  have	  an	  external	  border	  are	  required	  
to	  ensure	  proper	  checks	  and	  effective	  surveillance	  at	  their	  borders.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  
a	  borderless	  internal	  area,	  the	  migratory	  pressures	  at	  some	  of	  these	  borders,	  now	  
essentially	  entry	  points	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  EU,	  can	  be	  outright	  immense.	  What	  is	  
more,	  shifts	  in	  migratory	  flows	  due	  to	  political	  crises	  in	  neighbouring	  regions	  can	  add	  
considerably	  to	  already	  existing	  pressures.	  For	  instance,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  ‘Arab	  
Spring’	  led	  to	  strong	  migratory	  pressures	  particularly	  at	  the	  coasts	  of	  Italy,	  Malta,	  
Spain	  and	  Greece;	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  resulted	  in	  strong	  pressures	  at	  the	  Turkish-­‐
Greek	  border.	  It	  was	  estimated	  for	  instance,	  that	  Greece	  accounted	  for	  90%	  of	  all	  
detections	  of	  illegal	  border	  crossings	  in	  the	  EU.vii	  These	  pressures	  can	  thus	  be,	  in	  
some	  cases,	  extremely	  urgent	  and	  exceptional	  in	  nature	  ‘member	  states	  cannot	  cope	  
anymore	  with	  their	  national	  means	  (…)’	  (Respondent	  #20).	  
	  
For	  national	  authorities	  faced	  with	  such	  pressures	  at	  their	  borders,	  co-­‐operation	  can	  
be	  critical	  to	  their	  being	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  core	  tasks	  capably	  and	  avoid	  visible	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failures.	  Through	  Frontex	  operations,	  the	  host	  member	  state—which	  is	  generally	  the	  
state	  in	  need	  of	  European	  support,	  in	  whose	  territory	  the	  joint	  operation	  is	  carried	  
out—essentially	  receives	  additional	  (operational	  and	  financial)	  support	  to	  assist	  it	  to	  
cope	  with	  the	  added	  pressures.	  Under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  Frontex	  and	  with	  the	  
involvement	  of	  multiple	  national	  authorities,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  undertake	  joint	  
operations	  of	  a	  scale	  beyond	  the	  ability	  of	  any	  individual	  national	  authority.	  Frontex	  
operations	  can	  have	  an	  important	  stabilising	  effect.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  Frontex	  
director:	  
When	  we	  have	  joint	  operation	  at	  the	  border,	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  crisis	  is	  going	  
on	  there,	  otherwise	  we	  don’t	  have	  a	  joint	  European	  operation.	  
[…]	  
The	  pressure	  in	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  Frontex	  is	  involved,	  for	  example	  the	  RABIT	  
operation	  in	  Turkey,	  the	  flow	  is	  so	  huge	  that	  the	  assets	  and	  the	  energy	  of	  the	  
host	  country	  are	  exhausted	  with	  very	  basic	  things,	  just	  trying	  to	  maintain	  the	  
overall	  control	  over	  the	  situation	  (Respondent	  #8,	  2011).	  
	  
Secondly,	  also	  in	  the	  case	  of	  national	  authorities	  generally	  not	  impacted	  by	  such	  high	  
migratory	  pressures	  at	  their	  own	  borders—either	  because	  they	  lack	  an	  external	  
border	  or	  because	  their	  external	  borders,	  for	  various	  geo-­‐political	  reasons,	  are	  not	  
high	  pressure	  ones—	  engaging	  in	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  becomes	  important	  for	  
the	  effective	  execution	  of	  their	  tasks.	  With	  the	  removal	  of	  internal	  borders,	  such	  
countries	  are	  directly	  affected	  by	  developments	  that	  often	  originate	  outside	  their	  
territories,	  and	  over	  which	  they	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  exercise	  control.	  Co-­‐operation	  
through	  Frontex	  allows	  them	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  pertinent	  threats	  and/or	  tackle	  
them	  before	  they	  escalate	  in	  their	  own	  territories,	  pre-­‐empting	  visible	  failures.	  
It	  is	  relevant	  to	  them	  being	  able	  to	  competently	  carry	  out	  their	  core	  tasks.	  
One	  of	  the	  incentives	  that	  the	  member	  states	  have	  for	  more	  participation	  is	  
(…)	  that	  they	  have	  become	  aware	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  risks	  they	  previously	  did	  
not	  know	  about	  because	  the	  place	  where	  it	  really	  materialised	  was	  quite	  far	  
away	  from	  their	  country.	  But	  once	  the	  problems	  entered	  the	  Schengen	  area,	  
sooner	  or	  later	  it	  reached	  the	  other	  member	  states	  (…).	  	  (Respondent	  #8,	  
second	  interview	  2013)	  
	  
Given	  strong	  inter-­‐dependencies	  created	  by	  Schengen,	  national	  border	  authorities	  
are	  thus,	  directly	  impacted	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  border	  authorities	  in	  their	  daily	  
operation	  and	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  adequately	  manage	  immigration	  within	  their	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territories.	  Failings	  of	  border	  authorities	  in	  one	  country	  to	  recurrently	  detect	  illegal	  
crossings	  at	  their	  borders	  can	  gradually	  result,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  internal	  
borderless	  area,	  in	  increases	  in	  illegal	  immigration,	  a	  build-­‐up	  of	  asylum	  claims,	  
inefficiencies	  and	  backlogs	  in	  another.	  	  
Border	  control	  and	  surveillance	  is	  still	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  member	  
states.	  (…)	  But	  if	  you	  have	  a	  look	  at	  the	  migratory	  flows	  and	  the	  
consequences	  of	  migratory	  flows	  all	  over	  Europe,	  you	  see	  the	  entrances	  are	  
in	  Greece	  but	  the	  asylum	  requests	  are	  in	  Sweden,	  in	  Germany.	  (…)	  They	  are	  
the	  ones	  that	  are	  dealing	  with	  the	  asylum	  claimants	  that	  are	  coming	  from	  
other	  borders.	  (Respondent	  #20)	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  becomes	  relevant	  in	  supporting	  national	  
authorities’	  efforts	  to	  capably	  fulfil	  their	  unique	  tasks	  and	  thus,	  to	  their	  reputation-­‐	  
maintenance	  and	  reputation-­‐building	  efforts.	  As	  observed	  by	  a	  national	  border	  
authority	  respondent:	  
I	  think	  the	  member	  states	  are	  strongly	  motivated	  to	  assist	  Frontex	  in	  the	  
belief	  that	  ‘exporting	  the	  border’	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  upstream	  of	  the	  national	  
border	  is	  bound	  to	  reduce	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  national	  border	  
and	  to	  the	  reputation	  for	  competence	  that	  the	  national	  border	  management	  
authority	  hopes	  to	  gain	  for	  itself.	  (Respondent	  #15)	  
	  
And	  reiterated:	  
For	  the	  border	  force,	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  irregular	  migrants	  attempting	  
to	  enter	  the	  country	  will	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  times	  we	  make	  newspaper	  
headlines.	  I	  believe	  it	  increases	  public	  confidence	  that	  our	  border	  is	  being	  
managed	  in	  a	  professional	  manner	  that	  safeguards	  the	  security	  of	  all	  those	  
who	  are	  here	  lawfully.	  	  
Unlike	  in	  the	  case	  of	  EU	  law	  enforcement,	  bureaucratic	  reputation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
border	  management,	  while	  built	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  key	  national	  audience/s,	  is	  strongly—	  
rather	  than	  marginally	  as	  in	  the	  Europol	  case—contingent	  on	  transnational	  co-­‐
operation	  activities.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  very	  significantly,	  these	  co-­‐operation	  
efforts	  are	  not	  reputation-­‐depleting.	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
operations	  are	  led	  by	  the	  national	  authority	  in	  question	  and	  staffed	  by	  border	  guards	  
from	  other	  national	  authorities,	  as	  opposed	  to	  Frontex	  border	  guards.	  As	  observed	  
by	  a	  national	  authority	  respondent:	  
Frontex	  is	  only	  the	  mediator	  in	  the	  end.	  You	  don’t	  have	  real	  Frontex	  officials.	  
You	  have	  of	  course	  people	  wearing	  a	  recognisable	  emblem	  but	  they	  are	  not	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Frontex.	  It’s	  always	  other	  countries’	  officers	  helping	  you	  out.	  The	  perception	  
is	  that	  you	  stay	  in	  charge.	  Frontex	  is	  not	  taking	  over	  operations.	  It’s	  
supporting	  operations.	  So	  it’s	  co-­‐ordinating,	  it’s	  supporting.	  (…)	  It	  does	  not	  
lead	  the	  operations;	  you’re	  always	  in	  charge	  yourself.	  You’re	  supplied	  with	  X	  
border	  guards	  of	  different	  nationalities	  but	  you’re	  still	  in	  charge.	  It’s	  your	  
operation.	  They	  [Frontex]	  are	  not	  stealing	  the	  operation.	  It’s	  an	  important	  
difference.	  (Respondent	  #4)	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  operational	  staff	  on	  the	  ground	  comes	  from	  other	  national	  
authorities	  means	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  risk	  of	  another	  entity	  appropriating	  important	  
reputational	  resources	  from	  national	  offices,	  taking	  credit	  and	  competing	  for	  the	  
same	  turf.	  
	  Frontex	  does	  not	  suggest	  they	  ‘own’	  certain	  areas,	  or	  border	  control	  issues,	  
or	  problems.	  (Respondent	  #4)	  
	  
	  
Although	  technically	  speaking,	  during	  joint	  operations,	  other	  national	  authorities	  are	  
operating	  on	  another	  authority’s	  ‘turf’	  (both	  strictly	  in	  a	  geographical	  sense	  and	  in	  a	  
jurisdictional	  one),	  turf	  protective	  tendencies	  do	  not	  arise,	  as	  the	  reputational	  
uniqueness	  of	  the	  national	  authority	  in	  question	  is	  not	  threatened.	  This	  seems	  to	  
indicate	  that	  not	  all	  turf	  overlaps	  and	  infringements	  will	  be	  resisted	  but	  rather	  those	  
by	  another	  organisation(s),	  which	  can	  appropriate	  one’s	  reputational	  resources,	  
acting	  as	  a	  competitor.	  This	  is	  further	  aided	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  unlike	  in	  the	  police	  case,	  
individual	  reputation	  is	  not	  palpably	  linked	  to	  solving	  specific	  cases:	  ‘We	  don’t	  have	  
such	  cases	  and	  if	  we	  have,	  it’s	  really	  difficult	  to	  identify	  who	  really	  did	  it’	  
(Respondent	  #8,	  first	  interview	  2011).	  
	  
Co-­‐operation	  efforts	  are	  thus	  reputation-­‐enhancing	  in	  this	  case.	  They	  are	  relevant	  for	  
the	  successful	  fulfilment	  of	  national	  authorities’	  core	  mission	  while	  simultaneously	  
not	  threatening	  their	  reputational	  uniqueness.	  Co-­‐operation	  is	  perceived	  by	  national	  
authorities	  not	  as	  turf-­‐infringement	  but	  rather	  as	  being	  in	  their	  direct	  interest	  (a	  
national	  respondent	  even	  explained	  the	  drive	  for	  co-­‐operation	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
‘national	  interest’,	  Respondent	  #15).	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These	  co-­‐operation	  dynamics	  might	  change	  in	  the	  future,	  however.	  A	  European	  
System	  of	  Border	  Guards	  is	  being	  envisagedviii,	  which	  would	  likely	  entail	  the	  creation	  
of	  Frontex	  border	  guards	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  Frontex	  into	  an	  actual	  border	  
guard	  agency,	  much	  like	  national	  agencies.	  This	  would	  essentially	  assign	  Frontex	  an	  
overlapping	  ‘regulatory	  dominion’,	  with	  tasks	  matching	  those	  of	  national	  offices	  and	  
which	  could	  take	  credit	  for	  operations,	  essentially	  challenging	  national	  authorities’	  
claims	  for	  a	  unique	  contribution	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  This	  could	  alter	  the	  co-­‐operative	  
dynamics	  described	  above	  into	  competitive	  ones,	  giving	  rise	  to	  turf-­‐protective	  
tendencies	  among	  national	  offices.	  	  
	  
Should	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  European	  System	  of	  Border	  Guards	  take	  place	  in	  the	  future,	  
along	  these	  lines,	  this	  would	  offer	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  ‘naturally’-­‐occurring	  
experiment	  to	  test	  the	  explanation	  put	  forward	  here	  or	  indeed,	  elucidate	  whether	  
other	  alternative	  dynamics	  are	  at	  work.	  There	  are	  early	  cues	  in	  the	  meantime	  in	  
support	  of	  the	  analysis	  offered	  here,	  however.	  The	  national-­‐level	  respondents	  
interviewed	  spoke	  of	  a	  strong	  resistance	  among	  national	  authorities	  to	  the	  creation	  
of	  a	  European	  System	  of	  Border	  Guards:	  ‘In	  the	  corridors	  of	  the	  management	  board	  
meetings,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  issues	  which	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  opposition’,	  ‘it	  would	  meet	  much	  
objections	  from	  the	  member	  states’	  (Respondent	  #4),	  ‘it	  goes	  much	  too	  far’	  
(Respondent	  #3).	  	  This	  resistance	  was	  explicitly	  voiced	  in	  terms	  of	  institutional	  
tensions	  and	  competition	  with	  national	  authorities	  and	  the	  possibility	  ‘that	  they	  take	  
over’	  (Respondent	  #3).	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  national	  authority	  respondent:	  
If	  the	  strategy	  would	  be	  for	  Frontex	  to	  have	  their	  own	  officers	  at	  their	  
disposal,	  the	  problem	  of	  Europol	  can	  become	  the	  problem	  of	  Frontex.	  So	  
then	  you	  have	  a	  body	  with	  executive	  powers	  and	  capabilities	  that	  can	  be	  
directed	  to	  a	  certain	  place	  and	  more	  or	  less	  land	  there	  with	  a	  touch	  of	  
arrogance:	  “we	  are	  the	  solution,	  we	  will	  tell	  you	  how	  to	  do	  things”.	  I	  think	  the	  




If	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  add	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  further	  
standardisation	  will	  supply	  you	  with	  the	  same	  effects	  [as	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
European	  System	  of	  Border	  Guards]	  without	  starting	  a	  competition	  with	  
national	  border	  agencies.	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  6.	  Conclusion:	  Re-­‐thinking	  Bureaucratic	  Co-­‐operation	  
	  
This	  article	  has	  sought	  to	  explain	  divergent,	  and	  puzzling,	  patterns	  of	  agency	  co-­‐
operation	  arising	  in	  two	  comparable	  institutional	  settings.	  To	  understand	  why	  co-­‐
operation	  efforts	  proceeded	  smoothly	  in	  one	  case,	  while	  triggering	  strong	  turf-­‐
protective	  tendencies	  in	  the	  other,	  the	  article	  adopted	  a	  reputation-­‐informed	  
approach	  to	  bureaucratic	  co-­‐operation.	  It	  argued	  that	  the	  divergent	  co-­‐operation	  
outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  are	  shaped	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  the	  different	  reputational	  
impact	  of	  co-­‐operation	  for	  the	  national	  authorities	  concerned.	  
	  
In	  the	  area	  of	  law	  enforcement,	  reputation	  is	  largely	  accrued	  within	  a	  national	  
context.	  Against	  this	  setting,	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  brings	  marginal	  gains	  in	  
terms	  of	  reputational	  accrual	  for	  the	  national	  offices.	  Yet,	  it	  threatens	  major	  
reputational	  resources	  of	  these	  authorities—	  (intelligence)	  data	  and	  cases—	  
potentially	  sapping	  their	  ‘reputational	  uniqueness’,	  triggering	  turf-­‐protective	  
tendencies	  (i.e.,	  reputation-­‐depleting	  co-­‐operation	  efforts).	  In	  the	  area	  of	  border	  
management,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  trans-­‐national	  co-­‐operation	  becomes	  an	  important	  
aspect	  of	  national	  authorities’	  efforts	  to	  capably	  discharge	  their	  tasks	  and	  to	  
maintain	  their	  reputations	  for	  competence	  in	  an	  increasingly	  inter-­‐dependent,	  trans-­‐
national	  context.	  Pointedly	  however,	  and	  contrary	  to	  the	  Europol	  case,	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  system	  also	  allows	  national	  offices	  to	  maintain	  their	  claim	  to	  a	  unique	  role	  
(i.e.,	  reputation-­‐enhancing	  co-­‐operation	  efforts).	  The	  set	  up	  of	  this	  multi-­‐level	  
administrative	  system,	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  agency	  acts	  as	  a	  mediator—with	  actual	  
operational	  support	  on	  the	  ground	  provided	  by	  national	  (rather	  than	  European)	  
border	  guards—dispenses	  with	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  supranational	  organisational	  entity	  that	  
could	  potentially	  appropriate	  key	  reputational	  resources,	  and	  compete	  with	  national	  
offices.	  This	  appears	  to	  temper	  the	  surge	  of	  turf-­‐protective	  tendencies	  among	  
national	  border	  authorities.	  
	  
The	  analysis	  offered	  above	  also	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  envisaged	  reform	  
efforts	  in	  both	  cases.	  Neither	  Europol’s	  informal	  attempts	  aimed	  at	  engendering	  co-­‐
operation	  through	  ‘communicating	  success’,	  nor	  the	  broader	  and	  more	  sweeping	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institutional	  changes	  envisaged	  for	  the	  future	  in	  the	  Frontex	  case,	  are	  tailored	  to	  the	  
reputational	  dynamics	  identified	  in	  the	  two	  cases.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  these	  reform	  
attempts	  seem	  set	  to	  trigger	  (and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Europol,	  worsen)	  turf-­‐protective	  
tendencies	  among	  national	  authorities.	  	  
	  
More	  broadly,	  the	  findings	  point	  at	  the	  relevance	  of	  formally	  mandated	  co-­‐operation	  
efforts	  anticipating	  whether,	  and	  if	  so	  how,	  bureaucratic	  concerns	  with	  ‘turf’	  and	  
reputation	  will	  impact	  inter-­‐agency	  interactions	  in	  practice.	  The	  analysis	  above	  
indicates	  that	  co-­‐operation	  initiatives	  will	  likely	  prove	  more	  persuasive	  when	  mindful	  
of,	  and	  adapted	  to,	  bureaucratic	  reputation	  building	  processes	  in	  the	  specific	  
context(s).	  	  Ideally,	  this	  could	  allow	  to	  better	  calibrate	  the	  design	  of	  co-­‐operation	  
structures	  to	  reputation	  accrual	  processes	  so	  as	  to	  reinforce,	  rather	  than	  deplete	  this	  
link,	  for	  instance,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Frontex	  set	  up.	  Alternative,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  
difficult,	  approaches	  to	  promoting	  co-­‐operation	  could	  potentially	  entail	  attempting	  
to	  shape	  reputation	  accrual	  processes	  themselves	  for	  instance,	  by	  explicitly	  
incorporating	  transnational	  co-­‐operation	  results	  in	  assessment	  processes	  at	  the	  
national	  level.	  	  
	  
These	  insights	  become	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  complex	  regulatory	  systems	  such	  as	  
the	  European	  Union,	  where	  supranational	  bureaucratic	  newcomers	  are	  expected	  to	  
co-­‐operate	  and	  symbiotically	  share	  the	  same	  regulatory	  space	  with	  co-­‐existing	  
national	  structures.	  The	  ‘success’	  of	  such	  interactions	  may	  well	  depend	  on	  keeping	  
bureaucratic	  turf-­‐concerns	  at	  a	  bay	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  adequate	  
reputational	  incentives	  that	  are	  attuned	  to	  the	  street-­‐level	  ‘realities’	  of	  the	  various	  







	  	  	   27	  
Bibliography	  
	  
Ansell,	  C.	  and	  A.	  Gash.	  2008.	  ‘Collaborative	  Governance	  in	  Theory	  and	  Practice’,	  
Journal	  of	  Public	  Administration	  Research	  and	  Theory	  18,	  4,	  543-­‐571.	  
	  
Baldwin,	  R.,	  M.	  Cave	  and	  M.	  Lodge.	  2011.	  Understanding	  Regulation.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
	  
Bryson,	  J.	  M.,	  B.C.	  Crosby	  and	  M.	  M.	  Stone.	  2006.	  ‘The	  Design	  and	  Implementation	  of	  
Cross-­‐Sector	  Collaborations:	  Propositions	  from	  the	  Literature’,	  Public	  Administration	  
Review,	  66,	  44–55.	  
	  
Busuioc,	  M.,	  D.	  M.	  Curtin	  and	  M.	  Groenleer.	  2011.	  ‘Agency	  Growth	  between	  
Autonomy	  and	  Accountability:	  the	  European	  Police	  Office	  as	  a	  “living	  institution”’,	  
Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  18,	  6,	  848–67.	  
	  
Busuioc,	  M.,	  M.	  Groenleer	  and	  J.	  Trondal	  (eds).	  2012.	  The	  Agency	  Phenomenon	  in	  the	  
European	  Union.	  Emergence,	  institutionalisation	  and	  everyday	  decision-­‐making.	  
Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press.	  
	  
Busuioc,	  M.	  2013.	  European	  Agencies:	  Law	  and	  Practices	  of	  Accountability.	  Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
	  
Carpenter,	  D.	  2001.	  The	  Forging	  of	  Bureaucratic	  Autonomy:	  Reputations,	  Networks,	  
and	  Policy	  Innovation	  in	  Executive	  Agencies,	  1862-­‐1928.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press.	  
	  
Carpenter,	  D.	  P.	  2002.	  ‘Groups,	  the	  Media,	  Agency	  Waiting	  Costs,	  and	  FDA	  Drug	  
Approval’	  American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  46,	  3,	  490-­‐505.	  
	  
Carpenter,	  D.	  2010.	  Reputation	  and	  Power:	  Organizational	  Image	  and	  
Pharmaceutical	  Regulation	  at	  the	  FDA.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
	  	  	   28	  
	  
Carpenter,	  D.	  P.	  and	  G.	  A.	  Krause.	  2012.	  ‘Reputation	  and	  Public	  Administration’,	  
Public	  Administration	  Review,	  72,	  1,	  26-­‐32.	  
	  
COWI	  Final	  Report.	  2009.	  ‘External	  evaluation	  of	  the	  European	  Agency	  for	  the	  
Management	  of	  Operational	  Cooperation	  at	  the	  External	  Borders	  of	  the	  Member	  
States	  of	  the	  European	  Union’,	  available	  at	  	  
<	  http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/may/frontex-­‐eval-­‐report-­‐2009.pdf	  >.	  
	  
Dehousse,	  R.	  2008.	  ‘Delegation	  of	  powers	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  The	  need	  for	  a	  
multi-­‐principals	  model’,	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  31,	  4,	  789-­‐805.	  
	  
European	  Parliament	  Report	  2011.	  ‘The	  EU	  Internal	  Security	  Strategy,	  the	  EU	  Policy	  
Cycle	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  (AFSJ)	  Agencies.	  Promise,	  Perils	  and	  Pre-­‐requisites’,	  M.	  Busuioc	  
and	  D.M.	  Curtin,	  Study	  for	  the	  European	  Parliament’s	  Committee	  on	  Civil	  Liberties,	  
Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs,	  Brussels:	  European	  Parliament.	  
	  
Emerson,	  K.,	  T.	  Nabatchi	  and	  S.	  Balogh.	  2012.	  ‘An	  Integrative	  Framework	  for	  
Collaborative	  Governance’,	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Administration	  Research	  and	  Theory	  
22,1,	  1-­‐29.	  
	  
Den	  Boer,	  M.	  and	  N.	  Walker.	  1993.	  European	  Policing	  after	  1992.	  Journal	  of	  Common	  
Market	  Studies,	  31,	  1,	  3-­‐28.	  
	  
Den	  Boer,	  M.	  2002.	  ‘Towards	  an	  Accountability	  Regime	  for	  and	  Emerging	  European	  
Policing	  Governance’,	  Policing	  and	  Society,	  12,	  4,	  275-­‐89.	  
	  
Den	  Boer,	  M.	  	  and	  W.	  Bruggeman.	  2007.	  ‘Shifting	  Gear:	  Europol	  in	  the	  contemporary	  
policing	  era’,	  Politiques	  europeenes,	  23,	  3,	  77-­‐91.	  
	  
	  	  	   29	  
Gilad,	  S.	  and	  T.	  Yogev.	  2012.	  ‘How	  Reputation	  Regulates	  Regulators:	  Illustrations	  
from	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Retail	  Finance’,	  in	  T.	  G.	  Pollock	  and	  M.	  L.	  Barnett	  (eds),	  The	  
Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Corporate	  Regulation.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  321-­‐340.	  
	  
Gilad,	  S.,	  M.	  Maor,	  P.	  B.-­‐N.	  Bloom.2013.	  ‘Organizational	  Reputation,	  the	  Content	  of	  
Public	  Allegations,	  and	  Regulatory	  Communication’,	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Administration	  
Research	  and	  Theory,	  doi:	  10.1093/jopart/mut041.	  
	  
Gehring,	  T.	  and	  S.	  Krapohl.	  2007.	  ‘Supranational	  regulatory	  agencies	  between	  
independence	  and	  control:	  the	  EMEA	  and	  the	  authorization	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  in	  
the	  European	  Single	  Market’,	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  14,	  2,	  208–26.	  
	  
Groenleer,	  M.	  2009.	  The	  Autonomy	  of	  European	  Union	  Agencies:	  A	  Comparative	  
Study	  of	  Institutional	  Development.	  Delft:	  Eburon.	  
	  
House	  of	  Lords	  Report.	  2008.	  European	  Union	  Committee.	  ‘Europol:	  co-­‐ordinating	  
the	  fight	  against	  serious	  and	  organised	  crime’,	  29th	  Report	  of	  Session	  2007-­‐08,	  12	  




Kelemen,	  R.	  D.	  2002.	  ‘The	  Politics	  of	  “Eurocratic”	  Structure	  and	  the	  New	  European	  
Agencies’,	  West	  European	  Politics,	  25,	  4,	  93–118.	  
	  
Kelemen,	  R.	  D.	  and	  A.	  D.	  Tarrant.	  2011.	  ‘The	  Political	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Eurocracy’,	  
West	  European	  Politics,	  34,	  5,	  922–47.	  
	  
Krause,	  G.	  A.	  2003.	  ‘Coping	  with	  Uncertainty:	  Analyzing	  Risk	  Propensities	  of	  SEC	  
Budgetary	  Decisions,	  1949-­‐1997.’	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  97,1,	  171-­‐188.	  
	  
	  	  	   30	  
Leonard,	  S.	  2009.	  ‘The	  Creation	  of	  FRONTEX	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Institutionalisation	  in	  
the	  EU	  External	  Borders	  Policy’,	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  European	  Research,	  5,	  3,	  
371-­‐88.	  
	  
Lipsky,	  M.1980.	  Street-­‐Level	  Bureaucracy:	  Dilemmas	  of	  the	  Individual	  in	  Public	  
Services.	  New	  York:	  Russell	  Sage	  Foundation.	  
	  
Majone,	  G.	  1996.	  Regulating	  Europe.	  Routledge.	  	  
	  
Majone,	  G.	  1997.	  ‘From	  the	  Positive	  to	  the	  Regulatory	  State:	  Causes	  and	  
Consequences	  of	  Changes	  in	  the	  Mode	  of	  Governance’,	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy,	  17,	  
2,	  139-­‐167.	  	  
	  
Maor,	  M.	  2010.	  ‘Organizational	  Reputation	  and	  Jurisdictional	  Claims:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  
U.S.	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration’,	  Governance,	  23,1,	  133–159.	  
	  
Maor,	  M.	  2013.	  ‘Theories	  of	  Bureaucratic	  Reputation’,	  Working	  Paper	  Department	  of	  
Political	  Science,	  Hebrew	  University	  of	  Jerusalem.	  
	  
Maor,	  M,	  Gilad,	  S	  and	  P.	  B.-­‐N.	  Bloom.2013.	  ‘Organizational	  Reputation,	  Regulatory	  
Talk,	  and	  Strategic	  Silence’,	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Administration	  Research	  and	  Theory,	  23,	  
581-­‐608.	  
	  
Monar,	  J.	  2005.	  ‘The	  European	  Union’s	  “Integrated	  Management”	  of	  External	  
Borders’,	  in	  J.	  DeBardeleben	  (ed),	  Soft	  or	  Hard	  Borders?	  Managing	  the	  Divide	  in	  and	  
Enlarged	  Europe.	  Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  pp.	  145-­‐161.	  
	  
Peers,	  S.	  2005.	  ‘Governance	  and	  the	  Third	  Pillar:	  The	  Accountability	  of	  Europol’,	  in	  D.	  
Curtin	  and	  R.	  A.	  Wessel	  (eds).	  Good	  Governance	  and	  the	  European	  Union:	  Reflections	  
on	  Concepts,	  Institutions	  and	  Substance,	  Antwerp:	  Intersentia,	  pp.	  23-­‐76.	  
	  
	  	  	   31	  
Pollak,	  J.	  and	  P.	  Slominski.	  2009.	  ‘Experimentalist	  but	  not	  Accountable	  Governance?	  
The	  Role	  of	  Frontex	  in	  Managing	  the	  EU's	  External	  Borders’	  West	  European	  Politics,	  
32,	  5,	  904-­‐924.	  
	  
Perkowski,	  N.	  2012.	  ‘A	  normative	  assessment	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  
European	  border	  management	  agency	  Frontex’,	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  No.	  81,	  
Refugee	  Studies	  Centre:	  University	  of	  Oxford.	  
	  	  
Simon,	  H.	  A.	  1997.	  Administrative	  Behavior:	  A	  Study	  of	  Decision-­‐Making	  Processes	  in	  
Administrative	  Organization,	  4th	  ed.	  New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press.	  
	  
Wilson,	  J.	  Q.1989.	  Bureaucracy:	  What	  Government	  Agencies	  Do	  and	  Why	  They	  Do	  It.	  
New	  York:	  Basic	  Books.	  
	  
Wood,	  B.	  D.	  and	  R.W.	  Waterman.1991.	  ‘The	  dynamics	  of	  political	  control	  of	  the	  
bureaucracy’,	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  85,	  801-­‐828.	  
	  
Zanders,	  P.2002.	  ‘“Speaking	  Points”	  of	  M.	  Patrick	  Zanders,	  Director	  of	  the	  Federal	  
Police	  (Belgium)	  at	  the	  Group	  meeting	  of	  25	  September	  2002’,	  Working	  Group	  X,	  
‘Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice’,	  Working	  Document	  1	  (WG	  X-­‐WD	  1),	  Brussels,	  2	  
October	  2002.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i	  Frontex	  has	  had	  only	  one	  executive	  director	  since	  its	  establishment.	  
ii	  Council	  Decision	  2009/371/JHA	  of	  6	  April	  2009	  establishing	  the	  European	  Police	  Office	  (Europol),	  OJ	  
L	  121/37,	  15.5.2009,	  which	  came	  into	  force	  on	  1	  January	  2010.	  This	  is	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  Europol	  
Regulation,	  COM	  (2013)	  173.	  
iii	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  2007/2004,	  OJ	  L	  349/1,	  25.11.2004,	  as	  last	  amended	  by	  Regulation	  (EU)	  
No	  1168/2011,	  OJ	  L	  304/1,	  22.11.2011.	  
iv	  For	  example,	  Article	  4	  on	  risk	  analysis,	  Article	  7(3)	  on	  contributing	  to	  the	  technical	  equipment	  pool,	  
Article	  8b	  on	  composition	  of	  teams	  for	  rapid	  interventions	  of	  the	  Frontex	  Regulation;	  Article	  7	  of	  
Europol	  Decision	  on	  requests	  for	  the	  initiation	  of	  criminal	  investigations.	  
v	  The	  budget	  of	  Frontex	  has	  increased	  six-­‐	  fold	  since	  2006:	  from	  approximately	  19	  million	  to	  118	  
million	  in	  2011.	  Its	  staff	  numbers	  grew	  from	  79	  in	  2006	  to	  304	  in	  2011.	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viii	  The	  Frontex	  Regulation	  provides	  for	  the	  carry	  out	  of	  an	  evaluation	  to	  analyse	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  European	  System	  of	  Border	  Guards.	  
